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Le Corbusier and Ozenfant in Purism (1921) state the goal of Purist art as placing “the 
spectator in a state of a mathematical quality, that is, a state of an elevated order”.  This 
paper will take the poetic possibility of abstraction in the work of “modernist” architects 
as a guiding thread for an investigation of an alternative modernism in the twentieth 
century. 
 
If there is a modernism defined by the “universalising abstraction of technology” and the 
“unsituated tabula rasa” as pre-requisite for the creativity of the aesthetic genius, the 
argument will be made for an alternative modernism concerned and working with 
abstraction not instrumentally, but in a manner which, in making its own representation 
a subject for itself, gives space for a resonant creativity.  The contrast will be drawn 
between a “figurative” and aesthetic understanding of art and architecture on the one 
hand; and “abstraction” as a practice/theory where 
-  mimesis folds back on that which is mimed, and effects it (destroying its 
“originality”) 
-  the act of mimesis speaks of that act itself, saying something of itself 
-  and (thus) affects the work and affects the mimesis of the work in a 
movement of staging 
 
The aim will be at once to rescue abstraction from technological reduction, and to show 
abstraction as an ongoing theme for architecture.    page 1 
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Two Abstractions: Purism and the International Style 
 
Ozenfant and Le Corbusier, in their manifesto Purism, published in 1920 three years 
before Vers Une Architecture, state that the goal of Purist art is the placing of “the 
spectator in a state of a mathematical quality, that is, a state of an elevated order”.  
For them, the realm of art is structured as a hierarchy, and “the highest level of this 
hierarchy seems to us to be that special state of a mathematical sort to which we 
are raised, for example, by the clear perception of a great general law”.  This 
mathematical quality is characterised as an “intellectual order”, and “should be 
sought amongst universal means”.  In other words, Ozenfant and Le Corbusier are 
making a claim for the importance of an abstract order within the work of art – and 
also the work of architecture, which, as they say, has heretofore “most strongly 
induced the state of this category”.  Abstraction is installed at the outset of the 
project of modernist architecture as the key attribute of the work (of art or 
architecture). 
 
By “abstraction” I mean here a “philosophical” (ie itself abstract) notion, not an 
aesthetic category.  The abstract, here, is that generalising movement by which the 
particular is categorised under a law, a universalising movement by which an 
intellectual order is created. 
 
By contrast, Hitchcock and Johnson, in The International Style; architecture since 
1922, published in 1932 to accompany the first architectural exhibition at New 
York’s new Museum of Modern Art , explicitly set out a series of aesthetic principles 
for a modernist style of architecture which they contrast with both the individualistic 
styles of the previous century and the “functionalism” of some early 20
th century 
work.  Three principles define the aesthetics of the international modernist style: 
firstly: “architecture as volume”, in contrast to an architecture of “mass” or “static 
solidity”; secondly: “regularity”, where an aesthetic ordering emphasises the 
underlying regularity of the structural grid, characterised as per se economical in 
nature; thirdly: “the avoidance of arbitrary applied decoration”. 
 
Hitchcock would later, in his post-script of 1951, question the inclusion of the third 
principle, which he considers latterly to be “a matter of taste rather than principle”.   
(A better reason to omit it would have been that it follows from the first two 
principles, and thus is not axiomatic.)  He also emphasises at that time the flexibility 
of the stylistic framework they  perceived and established in 1932; since the 
“principles are few and broad” they provide a “frame of potential growth” rather 
than “a fixed and crushing mould”, according to Hitchcock. 
 
Hitchcock and Johnson’s pamphlet does exactly what is claims to do.  It defines a 
style of architecture and gives examples of it.  It defines this style in a series of 
clearly articulated aesthetic axia.  Allow me to highlight my own pleonasm by stating 
the superfluity of the word aesthetic in my previous sentence: since it is a question 
in the pamphlet of style, the axia must per se be of the aesthetic type; and vice 
versa.  The provision of a series of examples of the international style, taken from 
the MOMA exhibition, is entirely feasible and consistent with the stylistic and 
aesthetic concerns of the book; each photograph is neatly captioned with  short 
critique which places the particular building within the genus, subsuming each 
individual instance of the style under general laws  - or, at least, attempting to do so. 
 
I like this one the best: Jeanneret and Le Corbusier’s De Mandrot Villa of 1931, 
where the critique tersely states: 
 
 “ COMBINATION OF MASONRY AND ISOLATED POST CONSTRUCTION.  NON-
SUPPORTING WALL SECTIONS ARE OF STUCCO OR GLASS.  BADLY PLACED 
WOODEN FLY-SCREEN FRAMES MAR THE FENESTRATION” 
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No mention that the building’s “regularity” is entirely unrelated to any pre-conceived 
structural system, thus breaking the second axiom; nor that the massive masonry 
walls, very heavily articulated in plan and visible as “decorative” façade elements 
entirely ignores the first axiom of the purity of an architecture of “volume”. 
 
Or this, Mies’ Weissenhofsiedlung building, where the authors at least acknowledge 
that the building breaks the rule of “lack of axial symmetry” – although they excuse 
this as reliant on “general regularity”, not on “axial emphasis”; their comment on the 
plan, however, stretches credibility to the limit.  To my eye at least each flat is 
virtually the same, with minor variations to provide more or fewer bedrooms; this 
seems to Hitchcock and Johnson perhaps a little too functional, and the claim is 
made that “there is great variety in the planning of the individual apartments”. 
 
But whatever the failure of particular examples (would a building which faithfully 
adhered to them not inevitably be a failure?), the author’s intellectual effort remains 
strong; they have created a set of general laws which articulate the particular in the 
light of an overarching abstract structure or project.  Their work – the exhibition and 
the book – displays of itself an abstract and critical moment, philosophically 
speaking. 
 
Further, I think it is at least arguable that both the definition of the style and the 
examples they give of it (whatever their failings) are aesthetically abstract.  To take 
up the classical dichotomy between the figurative and the abstract, one could argue 
on a certain level that the international style is indeed “abstract” in nature.  This in 
contrast to previous architectural styles which had been all too figurative in their 
imitation of pre-existing architectural languages more or less distant in temporal or 
spatial terms.  (We might today ask what happens when a pre-existing abstract 
architectural style, such as modernism, begins to be uncritically imitated.) 
 
Hitchcock and Johnson’s work situates the question of abstraction as follows: 
a)  on the one hand, their effort as documenters and art historians engages 
critically with existing works of architecture and, in a process of 
abstraction, creates a set of general laws, an intellectual order, which 
enables them to define a “style” 
b)  on the other hand, this style – an avowedly aesthetic category according 
to the authors – has the aesthetic appearance of abstraction.  A 
universalising abstract style which, by avoiding the figurative concerns of 
local or traditional architecture, befits the name “international” 
 
Their definition of modernist architecture is therefore operating at a different plane – 
at a different intellectual level of abstraction - to the Purism of Ozenfant and Le 
Corbusier. For the latter, the work of art and architecture itself has indeed an 
abstract quality about it; but this abstract quality is not essentially on the level of 
style or the aesthetic visual qualities of a work.  The abstract quality rests instead in 
the inherence in the work itself of a “great general law”, which they characterise as 
the “ excitement of an intellectual order”, and which they contrast to the language 
of the preceding schools of aesthetics “nearly all of which considered only the 
release of the sensations of immediate feeling”. 
 
Paradoxically, this concern with an abstract order within the work bespeaks a work 
of art which will not necessarily be of itself “abstract” in visual terms, as we can see 
and as is made clear by the Purist critique of an art based on primary, geometrical 
sensations, which would according to the manifesto remain denuded of sufficient 
human resonance. 
 
There is thus a symmetrical counter-position between Ozenfant/Le Corbusier and 
Hitchcock and Johnson: 
a)  on the one hand, the abstract process of establishing a general law is 
used to define a style of architecture whose appearance is abstract, not 
figurative.  This is the international style 
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b)  on the other hand, a work of art which we can call “great”– taking a lead 
from architecture – is one which of itself has an abstract intellectual 
order, but which does not necessarily result in an abstract visual aspect.  
Thus says Purism 
 
 
Greenberg’s High Modernism 
 
Greenberg claims at the start of his 1960 essay Modernist Painting that modernism 
by that time covered “almost the whole of what is today alive in our culture”.  He 
defines what he sees as the essence of modernism insofar as it relates to this wide 
field; and then goes on to relate that essence to the specific discipline of painting. 
 
The definition of modernism is, for Greenberg, straightforward and succinctly put. I 
will quote at a little length: 
 
  “I identify Modernism with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of 
this self-critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant.  Because he 
was the first to criticise the means itself of criticism, I conceive of Kant as 
the first real Modernist. 
 
  The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic 
methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert 
it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence.  Kant 
used logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he withdrew much from 
its old jurisdiction, logic was left all the more secure in what there remained 
to it. 
 
  The self-criticism of Modernism grows out of, but is not the same thing as, 
the criticism of the Enlightenment.  The Enlightenment criticised from the 
outside, the way criticism in its accepted sense does; Modernism criticizes 
from the inside, through the procedures themselves of that which is being 
criticised,” 
 
For Greenberg, the self-critical moment is the essence of modernism, taken from 
philosophy and applied across all areas of human activity, including the arts.  Post-
enlightenment, the arts run the risk of becoming mere entertainment, but were 
rescued from this fate by becoming of value “in their own right”.  Because it was a 
question of their own character, rather than a relation to, say, an overarching pre-
enlightenment cosmic order which gave them validity, the necessity of a focus on 
the specific character of each individual art became, in Greenberg’s argument, vital.  
Greenberg acknowledges that this constitutes a narrowing down of the realm to 
which a specific art might relate, but avers that this is necessary in order that the 
“processes of that area (be) all the more certain”. 
 
In respect of this narrowing down onto the specific character of an art, in a self-
critical moment, Greenberg then states, baldly and unequivocally: 
 
  “It quickly emerged that the unique and proper area of competence of each 
art coincided with all that was unique in the nature of its medium.” 
 
It is on the word “medium” that my discussion hinges.  Not the only the only one 
this afternoon – Session 9 [Mark Godfrey and Chris Kul-Want] is entitled Medium 
Matters Today, where more than one of the speakers is addressing this very issue of 
Greenberg’s “medium”.  His use of the word is the classical art-historical one; he 
means the materials used in producing the work of art.  Thus in the sentence I have 
just quoted, the question of the unique nature of the work is posited in materialist 
terms.  And his use of the work “medium” is unsullied by any equivocation or 
ambiguity.  For his definition of what I am calling “high modernist” painting inverts 
what he claims previous generations had viewed as painting’s limitations – namely, 
its materiality, constituted by “the flat surface, the shape of the support, the 
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properties of the pigment” – and installs these as positive factors to be celebrated, 
openly acknowledged, and used so as to enable “art to call attention to art”. 
 
The modernist painting is thus: 
 
•  self-critical 
•  focused on its own concerns, gaining thereby a self-legitimacy 
•  respectful of and concerned with its own materiality 
 
The extremity of this self-validation of the modernist work is emphasised more 
strongly in Greenberg’s earlier essay from 1939, Avant-Garde and Kitsch, where he 
states that: 
 
“the avant-garde poet or artist tries in effect to imitate God by creating 
something valid solely on its own terms” 
 
But it is here that he does display an - albeit unacknowledged - ambiguity.  The 
paragraph runs further: 
 
  “But…the very values in the name of which he [the poet/artist] invokes the 
absolute are relative values, the values of aesthetics.  And so he turns out to 
be imitating, not God – and here I use “imitate” in its Aristotelian sense – 
but the disciplines and processes of art and literature themselves.  This is the 
genesis of the “abstract”. In turning away from subject matter of common 
experience, the poet or artist turns in upon the medium of his own craft.  
The non- representational or “abstract,” if it is to have aesthetic validity, 
cannot be arbitrary and accidental, but must stem from obedience to some 
worthy constraint or original.  This constraint, once the world of common, 
extraverted experience has been renounced, can only be found in the very 
process or disciplines by which art and literature have already imitated the 
former.  These themselves become the matter of art and literature.  If, to 
continue with Aristotle, all art and literature are imitation, then what we have 
here is the imitation of imitating” (my emphasis) 
 
Now, in evoking Aristotle’s definition of the arts as imitation, and in speaking of the 
imitation of imitation – or, as I should like to put it, the mimesis of mimesis – 
Greenberg calls to mind an entirely other meaning to the word “medium” than the 
specific technical and materialist art-historical term for the artist’s craft materials – 
namely, medium as “an agency that articulates meaning” (see the abstracts to 
Session 9 of this conference). 
 
He calls it to mind, but promptly erases it in favour of the materialist interpretation of 
this self-criticality. 
 
This erasure is sufficiently complete that the issue of the imitation of imitation does 




Mimesis of Mimesis 
 
I wish to argue for an alternative modernism, specifically in architecture but related 
to topical concerns in the other arts; an alternative which does not erase this issue. 
 
Returning briefly to Ozenfant and Le Corbusier’s definition of great art as that which 
of itself has an abstract intellectual order, my thesis is that modernism, alternatively 
defined in a manner unaligned with questions of style, visual aspect or aesthetics, is 
that series of works which, in self-critical but nonetheless not solely self-referential 
fashion represents to us the subtile movement of its own mimesis. 
 
I shall take it as read and without further discussion that architecture is 
acknowledged as mimetic.   The exact nature of that mimesis varies from the 
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extreme of typology on the one hand through to the perhaps more felicitous 
“mimesis of exemplary situations”. 
 
That work which makes its mimesis an issue for itself, holds within itself and 
represents to us its own general law – namely, the general law of mimesis.  In that 
respect, this representation of mimesis adheres to the Purist dictum that the work 
should itself present a general law and should generate the “excitement of an 
intellectual order”.  It is thus abstract, spoken not “aesthetically” but rather 
intellectually.  And this intellectual abstraction is therefore released from (although 
not divorced from) an aesthetic notion of abstraction typified by the flat blankness of 
the high modernist canvas.  Thus Sugimoto’s Vermeer, in articulating the abstract 
structure of representation, appears to be and indeed is on one level “figurative”; but 
on another level remains resonantly abstract in the “Purist” sense. 
 
The significance of Jeanneret and Le Corbusier’s Villa Savoye lies not only in its 
abstract appearance; nor indeed in the skill, novelty and shear panache of its 
architectural promenade; nor it its filmic quality; nor its ability to be overcome by a 
decayed sensuality that would proclaim an other architecture; nor yet its explicit 
references to an architecture stretched out between earth and sky embodied by the 
basement and the solarium linked by the enlightening movement of the spiral stair.  
It articulates, of course, all of these things and many more.  But beyond these 
articulations the work also takes all these mimetic moves and represents them to us, 
offering them up in a more or less explicit staging of its own representational 
concerns. 
 
Mimesis, conventionally spoken as synonymous with “imitating”, presupposes a prior 
existence which the mimetic image mimes.  To state it in imagistic terms; first the 
thing itself, then the image, the mime, of it.  Where, however, the mimesis itself 
becomes woven into this fabric, the conventional relationship between that which is 
mimed (the “original”) and that which does the miming (the “work”, the “image”) 
becomes disrupted in a sort of movement en abyme [the heraldic name for an image 
which contains an image of itself, and thus onto infinity].  This means that the 
mimesis folds back on that which it mimes, and disrupts and destroys it.  It effects 
it; that is, that which is mimed is strangely brought into being; the cause of the thing 
which we thought was original is thus instead that which is commonly thought of as 
secondary – namely, that which does the miming.  The originality of that which is 
getting mimed is destroyed.  In architectural terms this means that if, for instance, 
architecture is a mimesis of situation, then that situation is itself destroyed and re-
made by the mimesis that architecture effects, since it will give new and other 
alleatory possibilities in a resonant creativity between the work and the 
destroyed/renewed/enriched situation.  The task of architecture would be to question 
the supposedly pre-existing order at the same time as reflecting it. 
 
In this art of mimesis speaking of itself, it acts self-critically to problematise itself.  In 
speaking of itself, of its own mimesis, it poses not only the question about the 
nature of architecture in general terms; but, at the limit, poses the question: is this 
architecture?  The work does not rest content in the surety of its own position 
within an architectural canon, and this is perhaps why on the one hand, Corbusier 
would feel the need in the 1920s for an architecture radical in its abstract 
appearance, but to Hitchcock and Johnson’s confusion did not in the 1930s.  It 
might also say something about current concerns with the “everyday” and the 
“ordinary”; these concerns are effective as a questioning strategy because in the 
current context this still poses a question about architecture in general and about the 
nature of specific pieces as architecture. 
 
Mimesis staged.  The work says: look, here, you will see my production.  The act of 
mimesis affects the work.  It does not effect it – mimesis in not the cause whereby 
the work of architecture comes into being; it is something, rather, which has an 
influence over the work from within the work. 
There is thus a self-referentiality and self-generation occurring which, because it 
occurs at the same time as the mimetic act, cannot be characterised as a hermetic 
moment; on the contrary, the mimesis opens the work to the outside whilst taking 
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this outside not as a given, not as pre-existing, but as that which is susceptible to 
the chance of the new.  The self-generational character of the work is its only 
possibility to be itself new, since without that autonomy it would be reliant upon 
that which pre-exists it; and in its newness it gives the place where the new can 
occur. 
 
These concerns are ongoing in the most interesting continuations of an alternative 
modernism; but are also evinced in pre-modern work where the abstract structure, 
the general law I am referring to, can exist within the appearance of a figurative 
architecture.  Take your pick, here, between Hawksmore and Adjei. 
 
Let me end with this enigmatic building; juxtaposed with this staging; and this 
framing. 
 
 
Tim Gough 
April 2003 